The Presidency has pushed back against comments by Atiku Abubakar regarding recent military airstrikes in the Jilli axis, describing his remarks as “misleading” and potentially harmful to ongoing security operations.

In a statement issued via his official X (formerly Twitter) account, Sunday Dare, Special Adviser to the President on Media and Communications, criticised what he termed the politicisation of a sensitive counter-insurgency mission.

Government Explains Context of Airstrikes

According to Dare, the Nigerian Air Force carried out precision, intelligence-led airstrikes over the weekend targeting insurgent positions in and around the Jilli area.

He explained that while the location is still commonly identified as a civilian settlement, it has, over time, been repurposed by armed groups into a strategic hub supporting insurgent activities.

Security assessments, he said, indicate that the area now serves as a logistics and supply corridor for extremist factions, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province.

“The location no longer functions as a conventional civilian marketplace,” Dare noted, adding that it has evolved into a node for coordination, movement, and sustenance of terrorist operations.

Presidency Rejects Civilian Targeting Claims

The Presidency dismissed Atiku’s claim that the strikes may have affected civilians, stating that such assertions do not reflect the operational realities on ground.

Dare emphasised that the mission was conducted within the framework of targeted military engagement, aimed at disrupting insurgent networks rather than harming non-combatants.

“To frame a legitimate military operation as an attack on civilians, without acknowledging the context, is not only misleading—it is reckless,” he said.

Concerns Over Public Perception and Troop Morale

The presidential aide also warned that public commentary lacking full operational context could have unintended consequences, including distorting public understanding and affecting the morale of personnel engaged in high-risk operations.

He stressed that counter-insurgency efforts often involve complex intelligence assessments, where locations previously considered civilian may become compromised by sustained insurgent activity.

Political Tensions Over Security Strategy

Dare further pointed to what he described as inconsistencies in Atiku’s position on national security, noting that the former vice president has been critical of both insecurity and the government’s military responses.

“Criticising insecurity while also condemning decisive, intelligence-driven action raises questions about consistency,” he stated, characterising such positions as politically opportunistic.

Ongoing Fight Against Insurgency

The Presidency reaffirmed its support for Nigeria’s armed forces, stating that operations against insurgent groups remain ongoing and adaptive to evolving threats.

Nigeria continues to battle insurgency in parts of the North-East and beyond, where groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP have sustained attacks on both civilians and security forces.

Authorities have repeatedly called for responsible public discourse on security matters, urging political leaders and stakeholders to avoid statements that could undermine national efforts.

Conclusion

The exchange highlights ongoing tensions between political actors over how best to address Nigeria’s security challenges. While criticism remains a key part of democratic engagement, officials stress the need for fact-based and context-aware commentary, particularly on sensitive military operations.

As counter-insurgency efforts continue, the balance between transparency, accountability, and operational security remains central to public debate.

The Nigerian Navy has reaffirmed its commitment to advancing indigenous shipbuilding and enhancing special operations capabilities following a strategic engagement with the Egyptian Navy.

In a press statement issued on April 10, 2026, the Navy highlighted that the collaboration forms part of broader efforts to modernize its operational capacity, reduce dependence on foreign platforms, and strengthen maritime security in Nigeria’s territorial waters.

Driving Indigenous Shipbuilding Development

A key focus of the engagement is the development of local shipbuilding capacity, a move widely seen as critical to Nigeria’s long-term defense sustainability. By investing in indigenous production, the Nigerian Navy aims to reduce procurement costs, improve maintenance efficiency, and create opportunities for local technical expertise.

Defense analysts note that countries with strong domestic shipbuilding capabilities are better positioned to maintain operational readiness, particularly in regions where maritime threats require constant patrol and rapid response.

The Nigerian Navy has in recent years taken steps toward local vessel construction and refurbishment, and this latest collaboration is expected to accelerate knowledge transfer, technical training, and institutional capacity.

Enhancing Special Forces and Tactical Readiness

Beyond shipbuilding, the partnership also focuses on strengthening special forces capability. Modern naval operations increasingly rely on highly trained units capable of conducting complex missions, including maritime interdiction, counter-piracy, and coastal security operations.

Through its engagement with the Egyptian Navy, the Nigerian Navy is expected to benefit from shared expertise in special operations training, tactical planning, and operational execution. This is particularly relevant given the evolving nature of maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea.

Security experts emphasize that improving special forces capability is essential for addressing asymmetric threats, where speed, intelligence, and precision play a decisive role.

Strategic Importance of Bilateral Military Cooperation

The collaboration underscores the growing importance of bilateral defense partnerships in addressing shared security challenges. Egypt, with its long-established naval tradition and experience in both conventional and special operations, provides a valuable partner for Nigeria’s modernization efforts.

Such partnerships often go beyond training, extending into areas such as joint exercises, technology exchange, and operational doctrine development. For Nigeria, this represents an opportunity to benchmark its capabilities against international standards while adapting best practices to local realities.

Strengthening Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

Nigeria’s maritime domain remains a critical economic lifeline, supporting oil exports, trade routes, and fisheries. However, the region has also faced persistent challenges, including piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling.

By enhancing both shipbuilding and special operations capacity, the Nigerian Navy is positioning itself to more effectively secure these waters. Improved local production of vessels ensures greater fleet availability, while enhanced special forces readiness strengthens response to emerging threats.

Economic and Industrial Implications

Beyond security, the push for indigenous shipbuilding carries significant economic implications. Developing local shipyards and technical expertise can stimulate job creation, foster industrial growth, and reduce capital flight associated with foreign procurement.

Analysts suggest that sustained investment in this sector could position Nigeria as a regional hub for maritime engineering and vessel maintenance in West Africa.

Looking Ahead

The Nigerian Navy’s engagement with the Egyptian Navy reflects a forward-looking strategy centered on self-reliance, capability development, and international cooperation. As maritime challenges continue to evolve, such initiatives are expected to play a crucial role in strengthening Nigeria’s overall security architecture.

With a focus on innovation, training, and collaboration, the Navy aims to build a more resilient and adaptable force capable of safeguarding the nation’s maritime interests while contributing to regional stability.

Nigeria’s war against banditry and rural terrorism remains one of the most complex internal security challenges in West Africa. While troops from the Nigerian Army, backed by the Nigerian Air Force, have recorded significant victories across several frontlines, operations in the deep forest belts of Niger, Kaduna and Katsina continue to present uniquely difficult obstacles.

Unlike the Northeast war — dominated by insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP, where terrain is open and targets are easier to track — the Northwest/North-Central corridor is defined by dense forests, cave-like ravines, fragmented bandit networks, tribal alliances, ransom economies and near–zero state penetration.

This article provides a full-scale analysis of why troops struggle in these strategic forests and what makes the region one of Nigeria’s toughest battlefields.

1. The Geographic Reality: Forests Designed for Ambush, Not Patrol

The forests of Niger, Kaduna, and Katsina are not ordinary woodlands. They include:

• Kamuku Forest (Kaduna)
• Birnin Gwari Forest (Kaduna)
• Kuyan Bana Forest (Katsina)
• Kadara, Zuguruma & Allawa Forests (Niger)
• Dogon Dawa, Kuyambana & Dansadau Forest Belts (multi-state)
  — historically used for cattle rearing and, later, criminal sanctuaries.

These forests feature:

a) Interconnected Forest Networks

The forest belts interlink across state borders, allowing bandits to flee from one state to another within hours. For example:

• A pursuit inside Kaduna can end inside Niger
• A raid in Katsina can quickly shift into Zamfara

This makes containment extremely difficult.

b) Thick Vegetation

Many areas have:

• Zero visibility beyond 5–10 meters
• Narrow, winding footpaths only locals understand
• Large tree coverage that blocks aerial visuals
• Ravines that conceal camps underground

Such terrain neutralizes the advantages of army vehicles, artillery, and aerial surveillance.

c) No Defined Road Networks

Most forest interiors are:

• Unsuitable for APCs (Armoured Personnel Carriers)
• Too soft, muddy, or rocky for military trucks
• Easily mined or booby-trapped by bandits

This terrain naturally favors motorcycles, giving bandits high mobility.

2. Bandits’ Use of Motorcycles: Speed Troops Cannot Match

Bandits operate with hundreds of motorcycles, often in clusters of:

• 50
• 100
• sometimes 300+

Each motorcycle carries:

• A rider
• A gunman
• An AK-47 or GPMG

The advantage?

a) They Move Faster Than Any Military Vehicle

Motorcycles slip through:

• Narrow bush trails
• Shallow riverbanks
• Rocky passages
• Farmlands and cattle routes

Troops cannot match this speed with armoured vehicles.

b) Hit-and-Run Tactics

Bandits attack, retreat into the forest within 2–5 minutes, and vanish.

c) Dispersed Formations

Unlike insurgents who hold territory, bandits scatter in multiple units. Even when troops defeat one cluster, others regroup in nearby forests.

3. Lack of Permanent Military Presence Inside the Forests

The Nigerian Army does not maintain permanent bases deep inside these forests for specific reasons:

a) High Risk of Encirclement

Bandits know the forest better and can surround a base from all sides.

b) Logistical Impossibility

Maintaining a base requires:

• Food supply
• Water
• Fuel
• Ammunition
• Medical evacuation

But many forest interiors are hours or days away from military supply lines.

c) Zero Communication Signals

Most forest interiors have:

• No network
• No radio relay
• No satellite reach indoors under thick canopy

This makes coordination extremely risky.

The result: Troops can only enter, strike, and withdraw — not hold the territory permanently.

4. The Bandit Informant Network: Eyes Everywhere

Another major reason troops struggle is the extensive human intelligence network supporting bandit groups.

a) Villagers as Informants

Due to:

• fear
• poverty
• ethnic ties
• or forced collaboration

Bandits receive real-time alerts when troops:

• leave barracks
• deploy helicopters
• move in convoy
• set up checkpoints

Informants disguise as:

• Farmers
• Traders
• Hunters
• Local transport riders

This gives bandits a 5–30 minute head-start to disappear before troops arrive.

b) Inside Information From Criminal Collaborators

Some bandits have ties to:

• illegal miners
• arms traffickers
• cattle rustling chains
• corrupt local actors

All these networks feed them information.

5. Fragmented Bandit Groups Make Intelligence Difficult

Unlike Boko Haram and ISWAP with centralized leadership, bandits in the Northwest/North-Central operate in dozens of independent cells, such as:

• Kachalla Ali
• Yellow Jambros
• Dankarami
• Nagona
• Boderi
• Baleri
• Kachalla Mai-Tuta

Each camp has:

• Different loyalties
• Different hideouts
• Different commanders
• Different local alliances

This makes intelligence gathering extremely complicated.

To defeat insurgents, you take their “HQ.”
To defeat bandits, you must defeat hundreds of small, isolated camps.

6. Forests Provide Everything Bandits Need to Survive

These forests function like micro-cities, offering:

a) Natural Shelter

Caves, rock overhangs, and trees shield from:

• Sun
• Aerial detection
• Drone imagery

b) Water Sources

Most forests contain streams and shallow water bodies.

c) Food

Bandits steal from:

• Farmers
• Villages
• Trucks
• Herds

Thus, they can survive indefinitely without needing to enter towns.

d) Natural Barriers Against Troops

Ravines, cliffs, and dense brush slow troop advancement.

7. Civilians Are Scattered Inside the Forest Zones — Making Strikes Risky

In many forest-edge communities:

• Farmers till fields daily
• Women fetch firewood
• Herdsmen graze cattle
• Nomadic families live in temporary shelters

This makes:

• Airstrikes
• Artillery bombardments
• Heavy ground assault

…extremely sensitive.

Troops must proceed with caution to avoid civilian casualties.

8. The Bandit Economy: Why the War Is Hard to Win Militarily Alone

Banditry in the forest belts is not just crime; it is an economic system driven by:

a) Ransom Collection

Kidnapping is a billion-naira business.

b) Cattle Rustling

Stolen cattle are sold across:

• Sokoto
• Kebbi
• Niger
• Benin Republic

c) Illegal Gold Mining

Especially in:

• Niger
• Kaduna
• Zamfara

Gold money funds weapons and motorcycles.

d) Arms Trade Networks

Weapons flow from:

• Libya corridor
• Niger Republic
• Chad — via black markets

This economy sustains the war indefinitely.

9. Insufficient Aerial Coverage Across Massive Landmass

Niger is Nigeria’s largest state by landmass.
Kaduna is the 4th largest.
Katsina is also significantly wide.

Combined, these territories span:

• 115,000+ sq. km

The Nigerian Air Force cannot monitor every corridor 24/7.

A drone can only watch one location at a time.
A helicopter has limited fuel.
A jet cannot loiter at low altitude for long.

Bandits exploit these blind spots.

10. Troops Must Follow Rules of Engagement — Bandits Do Not

Troops operate under:

• Nigerian law
• Military codes
• International humanitarian rules

Bandits operate under:

• No rules
• No uniforms
• No fixed base
• No timelines

This asymmetry gives bandits the advantage of freedom, while troops must remain accountable.

11. Limited Community Trust Slows Operations

Many communities distrust security forces due to:

• Past reprisal fears
• Political interference
• Perceived government neglect
• Ethnic tensions
• Fear of bandit retaliation

This reduces:

• Community reporting
• Early-warning signals
• Deployment efficiency

Without community cooperation, troop success is limited.

12. Why the War Is Harder Than the Niger Delta or Northeast Conflicts

Niger Delta militancy:

• Terrain waterlogged
• But militants heavily dependent on oil pipelines
• Easy to track with naval forces

Northeast insurgency:

• Insurgents hold fixed camps
• Easier for airstrikes to target

Northwest/North-Central banditry:

• No ideology
• No fixed base
• No chain of command
• Highly mobile
• Terrain nearly impenetrable

This makes the war extremely complex.

13. What Could Turn the Tide? (Expert Recommendations)

Experts suggest solutions:

✔ Establish Forward Operating Bases inside forest edges

With quick-reaction forces.

✔ Deploy more long-endurance drones

To cover blind spots.

✔ Use satellite mapping to chart hidden camps

Forest mapping remains limited.

✔ Create a strong network of vetted community informants

Paid, trained and protected.

✔ Implement state-level forest management laws

To prevent illegal settlement and hideouts.

✔ Expand electronic surveillance

Ground sensors, motion detectors, and thermal cameras.

✔ Block illegal mining flows

Which fund bandit groups.

✔ Strengthen cross-border collaboration

Especially with Niger Republic.

Conclusion

Troops struggle in the forest belts of Niger, Kaduna, and Katsina not because of weakness or lack of bravery, but because the environment itself is engineered for asymmetric warfare. Bandits enjoy:

• Terrain advantage
• Mobility
• Informant networks
• Hidden economies
• Fragmented structures
• Civilian shields

While troops must balance:

• Law
• Humanitarian concerns
• Complex logistics
• Impossible terrains

Understanding these factors is key to crafting new strategies that go beyond military action and address the socio-economic and geographic realities fueling the conflict.